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Abstract 
 
It is commonly observed that the current methodology of product 
development in Islamic finance has failed to reflect the productive nature 
of Islamic economics. This is evidenced by a number of current products 
being substantially undistinguishable from their conventional counterparts 
according to the commonly-held views. Reform in this regard, if to be 
undertaken, must not overlook the positive and sound aspects of the 
current methodology used for product development, since this 
methodology has undoubtedly yielded some good products and helped 
fulfill basic Sharia requirements in transactions. As such, the following 
methodology needs to be adopted. First is to identify the necessary Sharia 
elements in any product structuring in terms of both form and substance, 
with a special emphasis on the ones that reflect the special constructive 
nature of Islamic finance. Second is to group these elements according to 
their observance in the current structured products. Having identified the 
neglected Sharia elements, the article will then examine the reasons 
behind their negligence, whether it is for necessary and unavoidable 
factors or just for ease pursuance. In light of the findings, the article will 
either consolidate the current methodology adopted for product 
development, or propose and lay down the basics of a new one that 
upholds the unjustifiably neglected Sharia requirements.  
 
.  
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Introduction 
The necessary Sharia elements in product structuring 
Sharia dictates that in any structure, the underlying contract must fulfill the 
Sharia requirements in contracts. Some of these requirements relate to the 
contractors, like being eligible to initiate agreements and being possessors of the 
necessary legal capacity. Others relate to the contract itself being independent 
and unconditional on the occurrence of something else. The subject matter of 
the contract needs also to be in line with the Sharia, most importantly being 
permissible itself and meant for permissible use. Having fulfilled all the 
structural requirements, the contract must also harmonize itself to meet, or at 
least not to be in conflict with, the objectives of Sharia, since an apparently 
valid contract may be misused to reach an evil end, or its implementation may 
result in causing serious harms and negative impacts. Therefore, it is 
indispensable to distinguish in Sharia validation of contracts between two 
elements, the form of the contract and the substance of the contract. The first 
relates to the structure of the contract, and the second relates to the essence, 
spirit and implications of the contract. Both are equally important and essential 
in product development; however, this equation has not been fully observed in 
many of the developed products. The balance has been obviously tilted in favor 
of the form of contracts at the expense of their substance.  
 
The following discussion will posit the importance of not compromising the 
contract substance when structuring products, and will identify the forms 
through which contract substance has been compromised and neglected in some 
of the already developed products.    
 
The relationship between form and substance in contracts  
 The maintenance of the form and the negligence of the substance has 
been the major problem in structuring and developing Islamic financing 
products. A careful study of the literature of Islamic law leads to 
discovering the fact that in contracts, the form is meant to protect the 
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substance. In many Fiqh applications, it is noticeable that schools of 
Islamic law have somehow compromised some aspects of the contract’s 
form but never compromised the contract’s essence or spirit.This  1 
implies that jurists viewed the form as something not meant for itself but 
rather to help protect the essence of contracts and agreements. Some 
modern practices of Islamic financing product development have 
implied the opposite; taking care of the form and neglecting the 
substance of contracts. This negligence of contract substance is 
manifested in different forms as explained in the following discussion.  
 
- Negligence of the contract substance by the deactivation of some contract 
rules 
No doubt that any contracts' rules and conditions are meant to enable the 
contract to serve its purpose in fulfilling the contractors’ needs in a just, positive 
and productive manner. This explains why contractors in Sharia are not allowed 
to make personal stipulation that may harm others’ rights (Ibn Qudamah, 1982, p. 
4/167). Naturally, a contractor, when given an absolute right in making 
stipulations, will try to turn the scale to his favor even if at the expense of the 
other. However, in some cases we find, especially in uqud al-ez’an (contracts of 
subjection) where only one party of the contract formulates the contract, that 
some contracts rules relating to the rights of the other contractor are indirectly 
neutralized by adjusting some existing clauses or incorporating new ones, as in 
the following example.  
 
Example: Ijarah Muntahia Bittamlik2 
                                                 
1 For more details on this matter see Abozaid, A. A. (2004).  Fiqh Al-Riba, (p. 367). 
2 This type of Ijarah is not found in classical books of Fiqh; it is a creation of the 
modern day jurists. It comprises two different contracts: contract of leasing (ijarah), 
and contract of sale (bay’). Bank promises the client that upon the successful 
completion of the Ijarah, bank will sell the asset to the client at a nominal price, or will 
gift it. 
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Being basically a contract of lease, Ijarah Muntahia Bittamlik in the Islamic 
banking application is supposed to fulfill the following basic Sharia structural 
conditions:  
 The leased asset requested for financing is valuable from Sharia 
perspective and not declared by the client to be used for Haram 
purposes. This would exclude for example financing clients in acquiring 
machineries that process tobacco products. 
 The leased asset is clearly identified by the parties, and the rent is 
specified in the contract. If there is gharar (uncertainty) in the contract, 
then it must be minor, since the excessive gharar invalidates the 
contract. 
 The leased property remains in the ownership of the lessor for the 
duration of the Ijarah period, and then it is transferred to the lessee by 
virtue of a completely independent contract, like a sale or gift. 
 The bank, as lessor, bears all the liabilities that are normally associated 
with ownership, like property taxes and major maintenance required for 
keeping the asset valid for usage by the client. 
 The lease period commences from the date on which the leased asset has 
been effectively delivered to the lessee (Al-Shafi’i, 1973, p. 3/14). 3 
  These are the basic rules of Ijarah Muntahia Bittamlik, and a theoretical 
investigation of any of its contracts in Islamic banks will prove consistency and 
full abidance. However, some apparently-valid clauses are added to this 
contract, leading to the deactivation of some of these basic rules and thus to the 
negligence and distortion of the Ijarah essence. One clause relates to the 
division of lease rental into three elements: fixed, variable and complementary. 
                                                 
3 This ruling has been agreed upon by the remaining schools of Islamic law. References 
include: Ibn Abedeen, I.A.  (1987). Hashiyat (Rad al-Mukhtar ala al-Dur al-Mukhtar), 
(p. 4/88); Al-Kasani, K.H. (1982). Badai' Al-Sanai' (p.5/67); Al-Bahuti, M.M.(1995). 
Kashaf Al-Qina’, (p. 3/53);  Al-Dasuqi, A.H. (1985). Hashiyah (p. 3/143). 
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The problem, however, lies with the complementary rent and to a certain extent 
with the variable rent. The complementary rent represents any cost the bank as 
owner has incurred in the past Ijarah period. The cost includes taxes, insurance 
and major maintenance expenses. Although these are supposedly the 
responsibility of the bank as owner, the bank after paying them claims back, 
under this clause, from the client the same amount by adding it up to the next 
Ijarah rental.  
  Obviously this paralyzes and renders ineffective the in-contract Sharia rules 
pertaining to the liability of the owner in Ijarah for the property risks. In fact, 
this practice of effectively shifting property risks to the lessee is especially 
critical in the application of Ijarah Muntahia Bittamlik since it brings this 
financing instrument closer to conventional financing after removing the 
justification for profiting, which is based on the notion of “al-Kharaj bid 
Daman”4 (liability justifies the gain). The core difference between Riba and 
trade remains the risk taking which is normally associated with trade. This risk 
taking is totally eliminated when the bank indirectly shifts the leased property 
liabilities to the client, and even in case of property partial or total damage, it is 
the client who bears it as he is the one who effectively pays the insurance 
premiums without a real recourse to the owner.  
   On the other hand, the problem with the variable element of Ijarah rental 
relates to the uncertainty this practice involves. Banks tie this element to an 
interest rate benchmark like LIBOR. The problem starts when banks do set and 
cap only one end of this excessively volatile benchmark, i.e. its floor. However, 
a ceiling needs also to be set and capped at a certain figure in order to minimize 
the gharar then involved and thus maintain the validity of the contract. 
Nevertheless, banks tend to only protect themselves from the undesirable 
movements of the benchmark by capping the minimum amounts payable by 
                                                 
4 “Al-Kharaj bid Daman” is originally a Hadith narrated from the Prophet Muhammad 
(peace be upon him); however, it was recorded as a Fiqh maxim by Al-Soyoti, J. D. 
(1980) in his “Al-Ashbah Wal Naza’ir”, (p. 154). 
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their clients and have no desire to cap the maximum amounts payable by their 
clients. This practice creates excessive gharar and opposes the Sharia 
requirement to determine the lease rental in any Ijarah contract, not to mention 
the injustice involved therein. 
Moreover, the above deviation from Ijarah Muntahia Bittamlik rules manifests 
itself more blatantly when the asset leased in Ijarah Muntahia Bittamlik has 
been originated from the same client. A client who needs cash or refinancing 
will be instructed by the bank to sell to it an asset or a common share thereof, 
then to lease it back from the bank through Ijarah Muntahia Bittamlik. The bank 
frees itself from all asset liability in the manner described above and the client 
repays with a markup the financed amount in form of rentals. This transaction 
has been widely used recently to enable banks to restructure non-performing 
debts in the wake of the recent financial crisis.  
Thus, we see how the same clause in one contract can be neutralized by another, 
leading eventually to the distortion of the contract substance and thus to 
stripping the contract of its Sharia spirit and objective. Although Islamic finance 
has developed Ijarah contract into a new model and helped maintain most 
Ijarah rules in this creative instrument, it has however left a room for individual 
Islamic banks to twist the substance of contract and deprive it of its nature as a 
lease contract.  
 
Negligence of the contract substance by attaching another contract 
Contracts of financial transactions in the Sharia are meant to fulfill the various 
needs of contractors, like acquiring an asset, acquiring an asset’s usufruct, 
investment of capital and delegation of authority. However, it can be observed 
that some of these contracts are driven totally out of their objectives when they 
are predetermined to be followed by other reversing contracts. 
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Murabaha5, which is a sale contract originally designed in its banking 
application to finance clients in their acquisition of assets, is used for a different 
objective altogether. It is used to provide clients with cash money through 
colluding to sell them assets on Murabaha basis then to sell the same assets on 
their behalf in the market for cash price. Clients get the desired cash and remain 
indebted to the bank for the Murabaha deferred price. Here we have two 
independent sale contracts each of them is independently lawful but the end 
result of executing them consecutively is a cash financing technique whose 
substance is effectively no different from conventional cash financing. 
Obviously, the result of this transaction is against the essence of the Murabaha 
sale contract. Murabaha in this transaction does not lead to real holding of asset 
ownership by the client. This is a deviation from the objective and substance of 
Murabaha, which is a commodity financing instrument that helps clients own 
their desired assets. 
 
Negligence of the contract substance by misapplication 
Contemporary collective fatwas have helped structure many products that are 
essential for the operation of Islamic financial institutions. However, the 
misapplication of some of these products may have caused them to deviate from 
what they were originally designed for.  A good example would be using for 
speculation what was designed for hedging. 
Islamic finance has developed certain tools to hedge against some inevitable 
excessive market risks. These tools include unilateral binding promises and 
tools whose underlying contracts are Salam6 contract and Urbun7 sale. Now, a 
part from the Sharia debate over the validity of these tools to be used as hedging 
                                                 
5 Murabaha in the banking application is a sale contract preceded by an agreement with 
client to buy the desired commodity from its supplier then to sell it to the client at the 
cost plus a markup (murabaha). 
6 Salam is the sale of future delivered goods against upfront paid price. 
7 Urbun is a sale with the condition that buyer has the right to revoke the agreement in 
return of forfeiting the advanced down payment, which is called urbun. If, however, the 
sale is concluded, then the urbun advanced is deemed as part of the price. 
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instruments in contemporary Islamic finance or Islamic capital market, some of 
these tools have been misapplied and used for speculation as well, although 
speculation was considered an invalid domain in what is known as “Islamic 
derivatives”.  
Recently one Islamic financial institution has offered a product whose structure 
is basically as follows: The client opens a designated investment account with 
the bank. The bank operates the designated account in its capacity as investment 
manager. The Investment Manager then uses the amount deposited in the said 
account to purchase Sharia compliant assets at some prevailing market prices. In 
most cases the assets will be shares selected from an Islamic stock index. 
The client gives a unilateral promise to the bank to sell the shares at a 
predefined price called the “Settlement Price”. The bank in return gives a 
unilateral promise to the client to buy the shares at the Settlement Price. 
The settlement price relates to the performance of some specified underlying 
reference asset (the “Reference Asset”, which could be an index) rather than to 
the performance of the Shares in the Islamic Account. Thus, two scenarios are 
perceived:  
Scenario I: The value of the relevant shares goes higher than the value reflected 
in the performance of the Reference Asset. In this case, the bank can purchase 
the relevant Shares from the client at a price lower than the market value for 
such shares at that time. Thus, the bank would hold the client to his promise, 
while the client would not be interested in holding the bank to its promise as 
selling the shares at a value which is lower than the market value at that time 
would incur a loss. 
Scenario II: The value of the relevant shares goes lower than the value reflected 
in the performance of the Reference Asset. In this case, the bank can purchase 
the relevant shares from the client at a price higher than the market value for 
such shares at that time. Naturally, the bank in this case would not be interested 
in holding the client to his promise while the later would hold the bank to its 
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promise, since he can then sell the relevant shares at a value higher than the 
market value for such shares at that time. 
Therefore, in both scenarios noted above the client will sell the relevant shares 
to the bank for the settlement price, as agreed, on the basis of the performance 
of the reference asset. This sale is certain since it will serve the interest of either 
the bank or the client. The certainty of this sale makes the mutual promise to 
execute the sale biding on both parties and thus the promise would be 
tantamount to a forward sale contract, which is unlawful.8 
Obviously the substance of this transaction is hardly distinguishable from that of 
any conventional derivative with the speculation element embedded therein; 
both contractors are speculating on the movement of the value of the reference 
asset, which is mostly an index. It is very likely that such a structure may even 
develop to involve financing the client to purchase the shares, then settling the 
deal with the loser of the two parties by merely paying the price difference.  
In conclusion, this transaction involves a misapplication of promise which can 
originally function as a hedging tool for risk mitigation, and cannot be used for 
speculation.  
 
Reasons for neglecting the contract’s substance in some Islamic financing 
products 
A direct examination of the Islamic banking market conditions, challenges and 
products identifies the following reasons for any deviation from the true rules of 
Sharia. 
1. The desire to offer the same financing facilities of conventional 
banks 
Conventional Islamic banks treat money as commodity, therefore they have no 
problem in providing cash financing with profit to clients. This cash financing 
                                                 
8 It is unlawful in the Sharia to initiate a sale contract whereby both counter values are deferred 
to the future. 
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can take the form of personal loans, over draft facility or refinancing, all 
through interest-bearing loans. However, since lending money on interest is 
haram, the Islamic banks willing to offer these profitable financing facilities had 
to design certain products that would serve such purposes. Logically, the 
designed products would necessarily lose Sharia spirit and breach contracts 
essence because they are basically meant to fulfill unlawful objectives, i.e. 
profiting from providing cash to clients. The structured products relied on bogus 
operations of selling and buying commodities, using mostly the highly 
controversial eina and tawarruq sales as their underlying contracts9. In fact, sale 
contract is basically designed to help people acquire commodities for their own 
use or to resell them and make profit, but it is not designed to justify unlawful 
dealing in cash by buying expensive and selling cheap simultaneously. This is a 
deviation from the purpose of the sale contract and a defeat of the purpose 
behind Riba prohibition. If engaging in cash financing with a mark-up through 
the technicalities of sale contracts like eina or tawarruq is halal, then the whole 
purpose behind Riba prohibition will be defeated. Any two willing to deal in 
loans with a return would simply do so through eina or tawarruq-like sale 
contract, the end result being exactly the same.   
  
2. The unwillingness to bear genuine property/contracts risks 
Being financial institutions, Islamic banks tend to avoid as far as possible the 
risk that is normally embedded in the Sharia contracts used in products 
structuring. This avoidance of risk may lead to depriving contracts of their 
                                                 
9Eina is a sale of commodity then immediately buying it back from the same party at a 
higher or lower price in order to justify exchange of cash with increment. Tawarruq 
serves the same purpose as the financier of cash sells a commodity to the client on credit 
then sells on his behalf to a third party for cash price. For more details on these sales see 
Abozaid, A.A. (2004). Contemporary Eina is it a sale or usury” (p. 5); Abozaid, A.A. 
(2010). Contemporary Islamic Financing Modes between Contracts Technicalities and 
Shari’ah Objectives. Journal of Islamic Economics Studies, Islamic Research and 
Training Institute, Islamic Development Bank, 17-2.  
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Sharia identity and rendering them spiritless. The application of Ijarah 
Muntahia Bittamlik in the manner described earlier is an example. The liability 
risk related to the ownership of the leased asset is effectively transferred from 
the bank to the client and thus the essence of the lease contract is distorted. 
Murabaha, which is a financing instrument which helps the clients acquire 
commodities, is another example when the bank frees itself from the Murabaha 
commodity liabilities. Neglecting the sale essence in Murabaha product is at its 
peak when the Murabaha client is appointed as the bank’s agent to buy the 
commodity from its supplier, take delivery then deliver to himself, without the 
bank being responsible for even the commodity defects or claim. In this 
scenario the bank's role is limited to only extension of money to the property 
supplier, thus mimicking the limited role of conventional banks.    
3. Legal constraints facing the right application of Sharia rules in 
products 
In some countries the legal system stands as a stumbling block to the proper 
application of Sharia rules required for product structuring in Islamic finance. 
Some Islamic banks for example find it inescapable to make the purchase 
appear in the client’s name, because according to some laws, banks are not 
allowed to trade in assets. Others are prohibited from leasing assets to clients 
and therefore they are left with no choice but to dodge and execute Ijarah in the 
form of sale. Imposing high taxes on registration of assets purchased is also a 
legal constraint as it eventually leads to increasing costs on clients when banks 
are commanded by law to register in their names what they buy before they sell 
to clients. Some banks tend to avoid payment of high taxes by reducing some 
necessary contractual steps or faking some contracts. 
 
Are these reasons justifiable? 
No doubt that legal constraints can justify some leniency and indulgence when 
necessary; however, Islamic banks have no excuse to follow the example of 
conventional banking offering the same products regardless of whether a 
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particular product is Islamizable in spirit or not. Islamic banks have to 
acknowledge the fact that not all conventional products can be Islamized, and 
that any attempt to this effect will yield nothing but a product borrowing its 
legitimacy from adherence to mere technicalities and meaningless structures. 
The avoidance of inherent risks to the degree of twisting contracts and 
deforming their nature is not justifiable either. In fact, it is necessary for Islamic 
banks to note that they become distinguished from conventional banks only 
when they genuinely submit to Sharia rules and maintain the nature and essence 
of Sharia contracts. The mere maintenance of contracts technicalities and 
terminologies does not render contracts in compliance with the Sharia rules. 
This issue is particularly important since Islamic banking derives its credibility 
from the declared full adherence to Sharia rules; therefore, compromising this 
notion, unless it is extremely necessary, is never justifiable. 
 
Conclusion 
The proper methodology for product development 
It has become obvious from the past discussions that for a proper structuring of 
a product under Islamic finance, three aspects of the product must be well taken 
care of. 
First is form, and form relates to fulfilling the Sharia basic structural 
requirements and conditions in contract and contractors. A contact whose form 
is invalid produces no legal consequences and is considered as null and void. 
Second is substance, and it is concerned with the essence and the spirit of the 
structured product, especially when more than one contract or element is 
involved in the product, since this may yield a controversial product as is the 
case with eina or tawarruq. Two sale contracts are involved herein, each is 
independently valid in essence, but the total outcome of having them 
consecutively executed is a highly controversial cash financing product. 
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Third is the implication of the structured product that has passed the form and 
substance test. The structured product must not lead to evil or have unfavorable 
or negative implications. Just like selling weapons to a criminal, or grapes to a 
wine maker, does not comply with Sharia although the contract itself may have 
fulfilled all of its structural conditions, an Islamic banking product cannot be 
truly labeled Sharia compliant unless it is free from evil implications. For 
example, in the absence of sufficient controlling measures on shares trading in 
the stock market, this market may become an arena for gambling and zero-sum 
games; therefore, developing a financing product that helps finance clients 
willing to participate in such market becomes haram, although the product itself 
may be sound in its structure and essence. 
In other words, for a product to be rightly labeled as Sharia compliant the 
underlying contract and tools used in its structuring and developing must be 
valid in form and essence, and the usage and implementation of the developed 
product must also be in line with the Sharia rules and principles. Reexamination 
of the current Islamic banking and finance products in light of this elaborated 
criterion is deemed extremely necessary, since there exist among the current 
Islamic banking products ones which have successfully fulfilled the Sharia 
requirements in terms of form, but unfortunately failed to fulfill that of 
substance or implications. 
On a final note, the recent trend of distinction in product development between 
a Sharia compliant product and a Sharia based product is inaccurate and lacking 
Sharia bearing. What complies with the Sharia is only what is halal, and a 
contract that is structurally valid but eventually leading to an unlawful end can 
never be regarded as halal. In other words, when we say that something is 
Sharia compliant, it means that it fits within the Sharia rules and principles. But 
how would a product that carries the same economic evils of Riba or gambling 
fit within Sharia set of rules and principles even if it has a valid structure!? 
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 If a distinction is ever made in Sharia contracts acceptability, then it is the 
juristic distinction between the two legal terms within the framework of Islamic 
law: valid and permissible. A valid contract is the one that has a valid form 
regardless of the validity of its purpose or the contractors’ intention. 
Conversely, a permissible contract is the one that has a valid form, purpose and 
objective. Obviously, a valid contract is not necessarily permissible since a 
contract can be structurally valid but it is conducive to evil or meant by 
contractors to reach an unlawful end, like selling weapons to a criminal or 
executing a series of sales to legalize Riba like in eina. This distinction between 
valid and permissible corresponds in fact to the issue of form, essence and 
implication of contracts. "Valid" relates to form, while "permissible" according 
to all schools of Islamic law10 relates to contract essence, implication and 
intentions of the contractors. 
 Therefore, a contract is acceptable to Sharia, or is compliant with the Sharia, 
only if it is valid and permissible, since both concepts are necessary elements of 
Sharia clearance, and Sharia does not admit a contact or a structure that is 
invalid in essence or implications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 This principle based on the well-known Fiqh maxim “Contract are judged by their 
essence and meaning, not by their form and structure”, which is originally derived from 
the famous Hadith “matters are determined by intention”. (This Hadith was narrated by 
Omar bin Al-khattab as in Al-Bukhari, I.A. (1984), (p. 1/3, Hadith No1);  Muslim, 
M.S. (1990), (p 3/1515, Hadith No 1907); Ibn Nujaim, Z.N. (1989) Al-Ashbah Wal  
Naza’ir,( P. 1/34); Al-Seyoti, J.S. (1980),  Al-Ashbah Wal Naza’ir, (p.21); Al-Kurdi, 
A.K. (1988)  Al-Madkhil Al-Fiqhi, (p.33).  
. 
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